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# Coercive Citation in Academic Publishing

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by Allen Wilhite and Eric A. Fong

## Introduction

Despite their shortcomings (1-4), impact factors continue to be a primary means by which academics “quantify the quality of science (5).” One side-effect of impact factors is the incentive they create for editors to coerce authors to add citations to their journal. Coercive self-citation does not refer to the normal citation directions, given during a peer-review process, meant to improve a paper. Coercive self-citation refers to requests that (i) give no indication that the manuscript was lacking in attribution, (ii) make no suggestion as to specific articles, authors, or a body of work requiring review, and (iii) only guide authors to add citations from the editor’s journal. This quote from an editor as a condition for publication highlights the problem: “you cite [editor’s journal] [once in 42 references]. Consequently, we kindly ask you to add references of articles published in [editor’s journal] to your present article.” (6). Sometimes gentler language is used, but the message is clear: add citations or risk being rejected.

To explore the extent and nature of such coercive self-citation, we analyzed 6672 responses from a survey sent to researchers in economics, sociology, psychology and multiple business disciplines (marketing, management, finance, information systems, accounting) as well as data from 832 journals in those same disciplines. We find that coercion is uncomfortably common, and appears to be practiced opportunistically. As editors game the system and authors acquiesce, the integrity of academic publications suffers. We conclude by recommending some steps that can be taken to reduce or eliminate the incentive to engage in coercive self-citation.

## Inappropriate, but persistent

Our survey asked respondents about their experiences with, and opinions of, such coercion (Fig. 1)(See Supplementary Online Materials (SOM) for details). They also identified 175 journals as coercers, many identified multiple times, with the worst offender being named by 49 different respondents. To put this in context, our respondents reported a total of 45,955 accepted articles, an average of 55.2 articles per journal. By that calculation the most flagrant offenders may be coercing most of their contributors.

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However, this rough calculation does not account for variation in the number of articles in journals, references per article, or disciplines. In our regression analyses we control for those attributes to get a more accurate picture of coercion.

**Figure 1: Percentage of responses**




Fig. 1. Survey results reflecting the extent, an opinions, of coercion. Percentages of respondents who (i) have been coerced, (ii) are aware of coercion, (iii) think coercion is inappropriate, and agree or strongly agree that (iv) coercion reduces the prestige of a journal, (v) they are less likely to submit to a coercive journal, and (vi) they are likely to add journal specific citations before submission. Percentage of journals in the study identified as a coercer also shown. See SOM for details.

While 86% of our respondents view coercion as inappropriate and 81% agree that coercion reduces a journal's prestige, and 64% even say they are less likely to submit to a coercive journal, the majority (57%) still say they would add superfluous citations before submitting to a journal known to coerce. More fine grained analyses suggest that there are differences across academic ranks and disciplines (Tables S7 and S8). Lower ranking scholars are more likely to continue submitting to coercive journals and are more willing to add extraneous citations prior to submission.

Authors in most of the business disciplines appear more likely to continue submitting to coercive journals than those in economics and sociology. Senior faculty members are more likely to resist coercive demands while junior faculty members are more likely to acquiesce. Finally, we find that familiarity coexists with acceptance. Scholars in disciplines that more frequently practice coercion see it as less inappropriate. And while the direction of causality is unknown, academics who have added citations in response to their editors' urging view the journal's reputation less negatively than those without such experiences.

## Strategic Incentives to Coerce

Editors' incentive to inflate impact factors through self-citation is damped by the negative reaction of scholars who disapprove of coercion and think its practice tarnishes a journal's prestige (Fig. 1). Consequently, editors face a dilemma and must choose. Their decision is complicated by a strategic component; if one journal coerces and improves its ranking then other journals are relatively worse off.

To further understand the factors seeming to influence the practice of coercive self-citation, we analyzed the survey data using linear probability models. Of the 6672 responses reflected in Fig. 1, only 4920 contained complete responses needed for our regression analysis. We also modeled the journal data to corroborate some findings from the survey data and also explore potential influences of publisher type. The journal-based data come from *Sciverse*, a collection of more than 18,000 journals in all fields of academic study. We selected journals for inclusion based on their content coverage as reflected by the All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) code number.

Modeling the editor's strategic decision making as a game we can hypothesize the following. First, coercers may try to soften the negative backlash of their actions by focusing on scholars of lower academic rank who are less likely to question or resist an editor's wishes. Second, editors might target manuscripts with fewer authors, so they confront fewer individuals.

Third, the strategic nature of coercion suggests that editors are more likely to coerce if other journals in their discipline coerce, thus we expect the practice to be concentrated in disciplines as opposed to randomly dispersed across fields. In our analyses, economics is selected as the reference discipline because it stands at the boundary of these disparate fields with one foot in business and the other in the classic social sciences.

Fourth, because a journal's editorial policies can be influenced by its parent publisher, we expect commercial, for-profit publishers to place a greater value on the advertising opportunities afforded by a rising impact factor and to be more open to coercion. University-based publishers are expected to put greater emphasis on their long-term reputation.

Our model results support these hypotheses. Table 1 summarizes the central results of the survey-based data, in which the unit of observation is the individual, and of the journal-based data. Editors are more likely to coerce assistant and associate professors than professors and to target manuscripts with fewer authors. Coercion differs significantly across disciplines, with results fairly consistent using both survey and journal data. Relative to economics, coercion is more prevalent in most of the business disciplines, and no more prevalent, or even less prevalent, in psychology and sociology.

The type of publisher appears to be influential as hypothesized; journals published by commercial, for-profit companies show significantly greater use of coercive tactics than journals from university presses. Academic societies also coerce more than university presses.

The journal-based data also allow us to test whether there is a relationship between journal rank and coercion. Somewhat surprisingly, the results (Tables S2 and S4) suggest that more highly-ranked journals are more likely to coerce. Our data cannot discern a direction of causality because some top journals may use coercion to maintain their position while other journals may have attained their lofty position through coercion. But either situation is unsettling.

**Table 1: Regression Results**

Hypothesized effect	Percent change in probability of coercion (SE)	
	Survey Data	Journal Data
Academic rank:		
Associate professor	4.3** (1.4)	
Assistant professor	5.5** (1.5)	
Lecturer	-5.6 (3.1)	
Graduate student	-0.4 (2.55)	
Confrontation avoidance:		
Number of coauthors	-2.0** (0.5)	
Academic disciplines:		
Sociology	-5.7** (2.1)	-6.5 (9.6)
Psychology	-9.0** (1.9)	1.6 (8.2)
Marketing	20.1** (2.1)	43.1** (11.2)
Management	15.9** (2.0)	32.2** (7.8)
Finance	18.6** (2.7)	37.7** (11.4)
Information systems	18.9** (2.2)	71.8** (13.8)
Accounting	4.4 (2.8)	29.3* (13.5)
Publisher type:		
Commercial publisher		9.2* (4.5)
Academic publisher		12.4* (5.5)

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$

Table 1. Model results exploring strategic-coercion hypotheses. Independent variables to explore each hypothesis are academic ranks (professor as the reference category), number of co-authors on the most recently coerced paper in the last five years or, if not coerced, on the most recently accepted paper, academic disciplines (economics as the reference category), and publisher types (university presses as the reference category). E.g., being an assistant professor instead of a professor adds 5.5% to the chances of being coerced, and each additional author decreases the chance of being coerced by 2.0%. Based on linear probability models, see SOM for details.

So authors are coerced, but how often does it happen? Studying the frequency of coercion yields similar results (Table S2): author academic rank, author and journal discipline, the number of authors on a paper, and the type of publisher are significantly related to the frequency of coercion.

## Conclusions

Overall the empirical results from the author survey and the journal-based data tell a consistent story. Coercive self citation exists and is more common in the business disciplines than economics, sociology, and psychology. Additionally, some editors seem to target specific articles and authors.

The American Psychological Association Publication Manual states, “Cite the work of those individuals whose ideas, theories, or research have directly influenced your work” (emphasis added) (7). The requests studied here do not heed that advice. While most of our respondents condemn coercion, less than 7% thought an author would refuse to add superfluous citations if coerced to do so. Thus, an author can become both a victim and a co-conspirator in the self-citation game; they are rewarded for acquiescing because their manuscript is published and their gratuitous citations help to boost the impact factor of the journal in which they published.

While this behavior is less common in economics, psychology, and sociology, these disciplines are not immune—every discipline reported multiple instances of coercion. And there are published references to coercion in fields beyond the social sciences (3, 4, 6). Future research could help elucidate whether and how these patterns extend to fields across the physical and biological sciences.

Without action the situation is likely to deteriorate because the strategic nature of coercion continues to put pressure on editors to coerce. Academic associations could help by officially condemning the practice. Their action would raise the cost of coercion to editors and may help convince organizations that promote impact factors to remove self-citations from those calculations. That decisive action would eliminate the coercive motive.

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[www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/335/6068/542/DC1](http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/335/6068/542/DC1)

Supporting Online Material for  
**Coercive Citation in Academic Publishing**

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**This PDF file includes**

Materials and Methods  
Tables S1 to S12  
References

## Supporting Online Material

### Material and Methods

This supplement begins with the estimation techniques and full results of the models presented in the main text. It is followed by a copy of the survey questions used in this study, the gross responses to those questions, and a discussion about the challenges and shortcomings of survey data. The journal-based data are also described. We used STATA, release 12, for all statistical tests and estimation.

### *The incidence of coercion*

The central results reported in Table 1 come from two linear probability models. Some findings use survey data, and the dependent variable,  $y$ , is whether the respondent has been coerced to add superfluous citations ( $y = 1$ ) or not ( $y = 0$ ). Other findings use the journal-based data set, and the dependent variable is whether the journal has been identified as a coercer ( $y = 1$ ) or not ( $y = 0$ ).

$$y = x'\beta + \varepsilon$$

In the first model, the explanatory variables in  $x$  measure characteristics that affect the chances an author will be coerced: his or her academic rank, the number of coauthors on a manuscript, academic discipline, the number of articles he or she has had accepted in the 5-year period, and gender. The explanatory variables in the second model measure journal attributes that could affect the likelihood that a journal engages in coercion. They include the type of publisher, discipline, the number of documents published by a journal in a year, the average number of references per article, and the rank of the journal. Both models are estimated using ordinary least squares to find the regression lines that most closely describes how those chances of coercion are affected by those characteristics. Tables S1 and S2 present the results of the full models. In addition to the results reported in the main text, Table 1, we find that a scholar who has more manuscripts under review is more likely to be coerced, but gender is not related to the likelihood of being coerced. Table S2 shows that journals publishing more articles per year are more likely to coerce and journals with a higher average number of references per document also tend to be coercive journals.

Linear probability models can be criticized because OLS produces heteroscedastic errors in models with categorical dependent variables and some samples could generate predicted probabilities that lie outside the 0 to 1 range. For those reasons, it is more common to estimate this binomial variable with a logit model, which uses the logistic function to constrain our predicted probabilities to a value between 0 and 1. This models the probability of an occurrence,



as a logistic function  $\Pr(y_i = 1 | x_i) = e^z / (e^z + 1)$  where  $z = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots + \beta_k x_k$ .

Maximum likelihood estimation yields the parameter estimates reported in Tables S3 and S4 (9).

These estimated coefficients are not as easily interpreted as the linear probability model coefficients, but they can be transformed into marginal effects ( $\partial y / \partial x$ ), which express the impact of  $x$  on the odds of being coerced (calculated using the margins procedure in STATA). Those transformed coefficients are quite similar in interpretation to OLS results. For example, in Table S1, the linear probability model suggests that associate professors have an increase of 4.3 percentage points (0.043) in their chances of being coerced than professors, whereas the transformed logit estimate in Table S3 says the associate professors' odds of being coerced are an additional 4.1% higher than professors; thus, the estimates are very close in meaning and magnitude. Tables S3 and S4 continue to show that all of the transformed coefficients are similar to the linear probability results in Tables 1. Assistant professors and associate professors are more likely to be coerced than professors, scholars in the business disciplines are much more likely to be coerced than economists, editors tend to coerce manuscripts with fewer authors, and commercial publishers and journals published by academic associations are more likely to coerce than university publishers.

The respondents in our survey have quite different publication histories; some published a single manuscript in the last 5 years, whereas others published dozens. To control for this difference, we included the number of acceptances as an explanatory variable, and its positive and significant coefficient was expected—individuals who publish more frequently are exposed to more editors and their chance of encountering a coercive editor is higher. However, the number of publications by a respondent may also reflect the salience of this topic to that individual, that is, individuals with many publications may attach greater (or lesser) relevance to the practice of coercion. Formally, this could mean the underlying response function may differ across groups. To examine the stability of these central results we partitioned the respondents into groups defined by their number of publications and then run the logit model on each subgroup. Table S3A summarizes the results of four subgroup regressions and Tables S3A1, S3A2, S3A3, and S3A4 provide the complete results of the subgroup analyses. Looking across the models in Table S3A, one can see how the coefficients emerge and how the central results are quite strong. For example, the full model suggests that assistant professors are coerced more frequently than professors. The partitioned results show that most of the assistant professor effect comes from respondents with fewer than 11 accepted papers. This makes sense—assistant professors simply do not have as many publications as associate or full professors. On the other hand, significant

discipline effects (business disciplines coerce more than economics, psychology, and sociology) emerge across the spectrum.

### *The frequency of coercion*

So authors are coerced, but how often does it happen? To investigate the frequency of coercion we used the number of times a respondent has been coerced as the dependent variable. This is count data, and the standard approach to estimating count data is Poisson regression. One of the distinct characteristics of the Poisson distribution is that its variance equals its mean, so the first task is to see if the distribution of coercive incidents meets that criterion. It does not. The variance of coercion (1.9) is almost four times the mean (0.4), and a likelihood ratio test shows this difference to be significant. To account for this overdispersion, we used a negative binomial regression model, which is a generalization of the Poisson model that adds a parameter to account for overdispersion (10). Although the estimated coefficients of a negative binomial model indicate the direction of impact (sign) and the significance of the dependent variables, those estimates are not intuitive (they measure the difference in the logs of the expected counts). To aid interpretation, we transform those estimates into incidence rate ratios, IRR ( $e^{\hat{b}}$  where  $\hat{b}$  is the estimated coefficient). Consider the 1.360 IRR for assistant professors in Table S5; it means assistant professors are coerced at a rate that is 1.36 times that of full professors (the omitted category). Similarly, scholars in marketing are coerced at a 2.736 higher rate than economists, but sociologists are coerced at a lower rate, 0.55 that of economists. The remaining IRRs are interpreted similarly.

Overall the frequency of coercion (Table S5) mirrors the incidence of coercion (Tables S1 and S3). Assistant and associate professor are not only more likely to be coerced, but they are coerced more often than full professors. Scholars in the business disciplines have significantly higher rates of coercion than economists, whereas sociologists and psychologists have lower incidence rates. Once again, to explore the stability of these results, we partitioned the data by the number of publications and reestimated for each subgroup. Table S5A summarizes those results, and Tables S5A1, S5A2, S5A3, and S5A4 provide the complete results for the subgroup analyses.

We also estimate an alternative version of this model. In the above, the “exposure” of a subject is considered to be the length of time covered by the survey, 5 years, and thus everyone has the same exposure, and actions they take, or characteristics they possess, influence how frequently they are coerced. As an alternative, one could consider the number of acceptances to be a proxy for the number of times an author is “exposed” to potential coercion. STATA allows

the researcher to model exposure within the negative binomial model and we do so using acceptances as our exposure control. The exposure model's results are presented in Table S5B and mimic the original results.

*What type of journals coerce more frequently?*

Turning to the journal-based data set, we investigated the coercers rather than the individuals being coerced. Question 16 (below) asked respondents to identify coercing journals, and because many journals were named numerous times, this is count data. Using those responses as a dependent variable, we look to see what characteristics of journals aligned with coercing journals. Because the dependent variable is count data (the number of times a journal is identified as a coercer) and is overdispersed, we used a negative binomial model. This second data set gives us an opportunity to retest some of our previous results (that coercion differs across disciplines) and to explore two additional issues. First, we looked at the relation between a journal's rank and coercion. Second, we investigated the potential effect of the journal's publisher. We did not have an a priori expectation on the relation between rank and coercion because more highly ranked journals face different benefits and costs of coercion than lower-ranked journals. For example, more highly ranked journals may get greater benefits from a small move up the ranks than a lesser-ranked journal, because the rise from number 6 to number 4 may be more beneficial than moving from number 57 to number 55. On the other hand, more highly ranked journals may have more valuable reputations at stake and thus be reluctant to jeopardize their stature by coercing authors. Consequently, which influence dominates their decision is unclear, and the relation between coercion and rank is an empirical question. Table S6 shows the results of our tests on the journal data. For interpretation, we also reported the antilog of the estimated coefficients, which are the incidence rate ratios. The results from above are supported. Journals in the business disciplines coerce more than economics journals, whereas psychology and sociology journals do not differ significantly from economics journals. Consistent with our arguments in the main text, publishers do matter as journals from commercial publishers and those published by academic associations were reported as engaging in significantly more coercive activities than university-based publishers (the omitted category).

One of the unexpected results in this study is that it seems to be the more highly ranked journals that coerce (Table S6). Given the coding of the journals' ranks (1 for the highest ranked, 2 for the second), a negative coefficient means that more highly ranked journals coerce more frequently. But one should interpret this result with caution. These data contain many journals and include some rather obscure journals. Consequently, "higher-ranked" journals may not be all

that prestigious. To control for that consequence, we repeat this analysis after trimming the data set to include only the top 30 journals in each discipline. These results also appear in Table S6. Focusing on the top 30 journals in each field tempers the results in a minor fashion, but the rank effect is still present and strong. Sadly, in the disciplines identified as practicing coercion, it is some of the most highly ranked journals that are leading the way.

### *Reactions to coercion*

Returning to our survey, we took the opportunity to ask scholars if they thought coercion was appropriate behavior, if its practice affected their opinion of the journal, and if they altered their submission strategies because of its practice (questions 2, 9, 10, and 11). Their responses followed a five-point Likert scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree or, in the case of question 2, extremely appropriate to extremely inappropriate. These data create a third type of dependent variable, one with multiple categories in which the order of the categories matters. To account for the categorical nature of the data and take advantage of the ordering information, we estimate this model with an ordered logit procedure. Ordered logit is a generalization of the logit model that allows for several different observed responses,  $y_i = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, m\}$  that lie in some natural order {strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, ...}. We observe  $y_i = j$  if the underlying latent variable lies between the cut points,  $\alpha_{j-1}$  and  $\alpha_j$ . Once again, the explanatory variables in  $x$  are expected to influence the probability that the indicator variable will move from one category of coercion to another as a logistic function,  $\Pr(y_i = j | x_i) = 1 / (1 + e^{-\alpha_j + z}) - 1 / (1 + e^{-\alpha_{j-1} + z})$  where  $z = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots + \beta_k x_k$ .

The ordered logit model used to estimate the results in Table S7 and S8 is sometimes referred to as the proportional odds model (9), and once again, we transformed these estimates to make the results more intuitive. In Tables S7 and S8, we report the marginal impact,  $dy/dx$ , of the dependent variables on the probability of moving from category 4 (agree) to category 5 (strongly agree). For example, the  $-0.108$  estimate on assistant professors in the last column of Table S7 means assistant professors are 10.8% percentage points less likely than full professors to strongly agree that coercion hurts the prestige of the journal; that is, they judge coercion less harshly than professors. These marginal impacts are calculated using the margins routine in STATA [see (9), chap. 15]. In general, Tables S7 and S8 show that individuals having more experience with coercion have a more moderate distaste of its practice. Scholars in the disciplines in which coercion is most common are less likely to condemn its use (although the majority still objects), more likely to acquiesce, and more likely to add the requested citations.

Tables S7 and S8 also show that individuals who were aware of coercion, and those who have acquiesced in the past, view the effect on a journal's reputation less negatively than those without such experiences. Table S9 shows that individuals familiar with coercion tend add more citations when asked to do so. As scholars are exposed to coercion they seem to get used to it.

#### *Data and data collection*

##### **Survey data**

Surveys are susceptible to self-selection and nonresponse bias, so we chose our survey design, collection method, and analyses with that in mind. Our target population was the academic membership (professors, full-time instructors, and graduate students) of eight disciplines in social science and business. They are American Psychological Association, American Sociological Association, American Economic Association, American Accounting Association, American Marketing Association, Academy of Information Systems, Academy of Management, and the Financial Management Association. The survey was sent to 54,712 email addresses that were either obtained from those associations (some at no charge, others for a small fee), from university Web sites, professional meeting programs, and colleagues. The body of the email contained a description of coercive self-citation and a link to the survey. This study used 15 multiple choice questions and one question asking for a written response. Three weeks after the initial contact, we sent a reminder email. The aggregate response rate was 12.2%, remarkably high given the length of the cover email, the length of the survey, and the fact that we could not know if our survey was directed to junk mail folders or filtered as spam. We finished with 6672 responses from eight disciplines, but incomplete surveys and responses from unrelated disciplines reduced the usable sample to 4920 people. We use only 4920 responses in our statistical analysis because we need complete surveys (a response to every pertinent question) to run our regressions. Figure 1 is still based on the 6672 raw responses because we had many people report that they had been coerced or had never been coerced but then chose not to answer a later question (for example, several hundred people did not answer the gender question—which is not uncommon). Because those larger numbers are accurate for the descriptive statistics such as “% being coerced” we used them in the figure, and we specifically direct the reader to those raw responses in the legends.

The cover email, survey questions and response counts follow.  
To begin all potential respondents received this email.

Colleagues-

Recently a friend had an article accepted for publication. Two weeks after that acceptance the editor sent another letter asking the author to add citations from his journal. Specifically the editor wrote, “*you only use one (name of my journal) source which is unacceptable. Please add at least five more relevant-(name of my journal) sources.*”

Another colleague had a similar experience at the submission stage; the editor asked her for three more citations to his journal before he would send her manuscript out for review. Note, these citation requests did not mention omitted content or shortcomings in the manuscript’s analysis; they simply asked authors to cite related articles in the editor’s journal.

This practice is controversial. Some view it as inappropriate behavior, padding citations and diluting the value of the reference list. Others see it as a legitimate way to introduce readers to past literature in the editor’s journal. This study investigates this issue and we need your help.

The following link takes you to a survey prepared in *SurveyMonkey*©. Would you please take a moment to complete it—it will take only a couple of minutes. As required by our Institutional Review Board, individual identities will not be revealed or linked to specific responses. In fact, the *SurveyMonkey*© link does not connect responses to responders; we cannot identify your responses. IRB contact information: [IRB email address]

Thank you for your help.            [Link to survey]

Subjects who followed the link came to the survey which opened with the following statement.

*Journal Citation Survey*

“Some editors ask authors who have a manuscript under review at their journal to add citations to articles in the editor's journal even though those articles are not critical to the manuscript under review. Such citation requests are not based on a perceived omission in the manuscript's academic content; these editors are simply asking authors to add citations to their home journal as a condition of acceptance or review.”

1. Prior to this survey, were you aware of this practice?

YES: 2761      NO: 3897

2. How appropriate or how inappropriate do you view this practice (requesting citations to the editor's home journal for reasons not based on content)?

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Extremely	Appropriate:	Neutral:	Inappropriate:	Extremely
Appropriate: 108	214	552	2394	Inappropriate: 3394

3. Within the last five years have you received a request from an editor to add more citations from the editor's journal for reasons that were not based on content?

YES: 1306 NO: 5338

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**The next three questions were asked only of those who answered YES to question 3.**

4. In the last five years, approximately HOW MANY TIMES have you received a request from the editor to add more citations from the editor's journal for reasons that were not based on content?

1. 519	6. 16
2. 390	7. 6
3. 176	8. 2
4. 47	9. 0
5. 36	10 or more. 8 (actual number specified)

Please focus on the most recent incidence in which an editor asked you to add citations for reasons not based on content. Refer to that experience for questions 5-7.

5. How many citations did the editor(s) ask you to add to your manuscript?

not specified: 593	
1 citation: 56	5 citations: 128
2 citations: 144	6 citations: 7
3 citations: 178	7 citations: 4
4 citations: 59	8 or more: 35 (actual number was specified)

6. How many citations did you add?

0 citations: 129	
1 citation: 143	5 citations: 139
2 citations: 293	6 citations: 20
3 citations: 302	7 citations: 14
4 citations: 120	8 or more: 41 (actual number was specified)

7. How many co-authors did you have on this manuscript?

0 (sole author). 186	4. 35
1. 438	5. 4
2. 413	6. 3
3. 115	7 or more. 1

---

**The next question was asked only of those who answered NO to question 3.**

Please focus on your most recently accepted manuscript and refer to that experience when you answer the next question.

8. How many co-authors did you have on your most recently accepted paper?

0 (sole author).	1047	4.	190
1.	1556	5.	86
2.	1297	6.	31
3.	625	7 or more.	37

**The remaining questions were asked of all respondents.**

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

9. "If an editor asks authors to add citations to their home journal for reasons not based on the content of the manuscript, that reduces the prestige of the journal in my eyes."

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Strongly	Disagree:	Neutral:	Agree:	Strongly
Disagree: 87	331	732	2425	Agree: 2523

10. "All else equal, I am less likely to submit manuscripts to journals that make these requests."

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Strongly	Disagree:	Neutral:	Agree:	Strongly
Disagree: 160	676	1322	2156	Agree: 1777

11. "If I were submitting an article to a journal with a reputation of asking for citations to itself even if those citations are not critical to the content of the article, I would probably add such citations BEFORE SUBMISSION."

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Strongly	Disagree:	Neutral:	Agree:	Strongly
Disagree: 564	1051	991	2640	Agree: 834

12. What is your current rank?

Professor:	2195	Lecturer/Instructor:	209
Associate Professor:	1401	Graduate Student:	439
Assistant Professor:	1310	Other:	393

13. In what discipline is your primary research?

Psychology:	1106	Finance:	318
Sociology:	783	Marketing:	626
Economics:	1098	Computer/Management Information Systems:	542
Management:	740	Accounting:	265
Other (please specify):	565		



14. Gender: Male: 3905            Female: 1993

15. Within the last five years, approximately how many publications, including acceptances, do you have?

1 publication:	273	7 publications:	252
2 publications:	399	8 publications:	305
3 publications:	524	9 publications:	103
4 publications:	462	10 publications:	480
5 publications:	602	11 or more publications:	1254
6 publications:	328		

16. (Optional) To track the possible spread of this practice we need to know specific journals. Would you please provide the names of Journals you know engage in this practice?

480 people provided the names of 357 different journals.

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End of survey. Thank you.

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Use of survey data. When using survey data, one must examine its representativeness, i.e., do the sentiments expressed in the returned surveys represent the population or do nonrespondents feel differently from respondents? Short of a census, there is no way of knowing the specific extent of nonresponse bias, but there are ways to gauge the general level of representativeness. A standard approach is to compare some underlying demographic characteristics of the population and sample. Although most of the academic associations collect little demographic data on their members, three (the American Economic Association, the American Accounting Association, and the Academy of Management) conduct periodic surveys of their disciplines and have data on gender and professorial rank. Three additional associations (the American Psychological Association, the American Sociological Association, and the Academy of Information Systems) have gender data. Table S10 compares the sample and population means and the results are encouraging. With only a few exceptions, our sample responses are within a few percentage points of the population measures. The percentage of female psychologists is smaller in our sample than in the population, but with more than 400 female psychologists in the sample, their views are represented. There are fewer assistant professors responding in the accounting profession than in the general population, but they still make up 26% of the accounting sample. Overall, the sample is reflective of the population, and more important, every category has a substantial number of entries.

When population statistics are not available, late respondents can be compared with early respondents, if one assumes that late respondents are more closely identified with

nonrespondents. Table S11 presents mean responses for the first quartile and last quartile of respondents in the eight disciplines for six different survey questions giving 48 pairs of early-late responses. There are several statistically relevant differences between some early and late responders, but there is no pattern to these differences; no evidence of systematic bias. For example, in three of the disciplines, individuals who were aware of coercion and who have been coerced were more likely to respond early, but in one discipline they responded more slowly and the other four disciplines saw no difference. Similarly, in three disciplines individuals who have more acceptances were more likely to respond early, but in the remaining five disciplines there was no distinction between early and late responses.

Shortcomings of surveys. Respondents may differ from nonrespondents because of their interest in the topic. Thus, a segment of the population can be overrepresented or underrepresented in the sample, and if their opinion differs from the rest of the sample, then the estimates may be biased. We addressed this issue in three ways. First, we recognized that our target population consists of academics engaged and intending to be engaged in research and publication and that coercion may be of little interest to individuals who have never published and do not intend to publish. For example, many members of the American Sociological Association have careers as social workers and counselors; publication may be less important in their careers. Consequently, they may have less concern about editing practices and may respond differently from our target population. To remove that influence, we focused on members of the academic community identified by their professional rank (from professors to graduate students). Still, some of the remaining individuals do not publish and do not intend to publish (instructors at teaching schools for instance). We investigated the influence of these zero publishers on our results, and they were minimal; none of the estimated coefficients changed sign or their level of significance when the group of zero publishers was included or excluded from the sample. Second, we continued to partition the data set on the basis of the number of publications and acceptances of the respondents, and we estimated the coercion model on those subsets. The overall results of the tests on these subsets suggest that these results are stable (Tables S3A1-A4 and S5A1-A4). Third, we investigated a variable designed to measure the degree of interest in this topic by our respondents. One of the survey questions (number 2 above) reads, “*How appropriate or how inappropriate do you view this practice (requesting citations to the editor’s home journal for reasons not based on content)?*” Answers lie on a scale from one to five for extremely appropriate to extremely inappropriate. Labeling the responses of each individual  $r$  ( $r \in \{1, \dots, 5\}$ ) we constructed this saliency variable as  $(r - 3)^2$ , which rises as an individual’s view of coercion is more extreme, either appropriate or inappropriate. From a theoretical

perspective, this variable may not belong in the final model because it could be a consequence of coercion rather than a precursor, but including it in a separate regression gives us some insight into its effect on our results, and they are minor. The result is that its inclusion does not affect the other coefficients in the model—saliency does not seem to be disrupting our estimates.

Still, this study is based, in part, on a survey, and readers should remember that survey-based research has shortcomings. Respondents can purposefully misrepresent their experiences or remember them incorrectly, and even a completely random sample can misrepresent a population. Surveys also have to balance the length and depth of questions because respondents spend little time with the instrument; this can bring compromises. For example, impact factors count citations in the last 2 years, so we could have asked respondents to limit their responses to editorial requests that specifically mention that window. We did not narrow our question for several reasons. First, it may not matter, i.e., if an editor asks for more citations, some of those are likely to be recent citations. Second, some impact factors go back 3 and 5 years, and whereas those garner less attention, a journal could turn to them as a measure. Third, asking respondents for that level of detail may require them to go back and look up old editorial letters, which increases the burden of filling out the survey.

### **Journal data**

Given the shortcomings of survey-based research, we turn to another source of data, a database of journal metrics, to verify and extend our results. The journal-based data come from Sciverse (*11*), a collection of more than 18,000 journals in all fields of academic study. It has information on the number of articles published each year, the average number of citations per manuscript, the rank of the journal, disciplines that most frequently publish in the journal, the publisher, and so forth. As noted earlier, each journal in the data set carries an All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) code number. We reduced the Sciverse database by removing journals lacking the following ASJC codes: 1400–1410 (Business, Management, and Accounting); 1710 (Computer Information Systems); 1800–1804 (Decision Sciences, Management Science and Information Systems); 2000–2003 (Economics, Econometrics, and Finance); 3200–3207 (Psychology); and 3300–3322 (Social Sciences) except 3304 (Education), 3305 (Geography), and 3320 (Political Science and International Relations). This group was trimmed further by eliminating non-English journals and publications with impact factors less than 0.10 to remove nonscholarly publications. The resulting data set contains the independent variables used in the estimations for Tables S2, S4, and S6.

**Table S1.** Coercion. A Linear Probability Model is performed with coercion (0 = not coerced in the last five years, 1 = coerced in the last five years) as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (assistant professor, associate professor, graduate student, and lecturer with professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (sociology, psychology, etc. with economics as the omitted category), gender, number of accepted papers in the last five years, and number of co-authors on most recently coerced paper in the last five years or, if not coerced, on most recently accepted paper. Coefficients represent probabilities (e.g., an assistant professor has a .055 higher probability of being coerced than a professor).

Independent Variables	Probability of Coercion (SE)
Constant	0.132** (0.018)
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.043** (0.014)
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.055** (0.015)
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.056 (0.031)
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.004 (0.025)
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.057** (0.021)
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.090** (0.019)
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.201** (0.021)
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.159** (0.020)
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.186** (0.027)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.189** (0.022)
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.044 (0.028)
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	0.022 (0.012)
Number of accepted papers	0.007** (0.001)
Number of coauthors	-0.020** (0.005)
$R^2$	0.111
$F$	43.50**
$N$	4918

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$

**Table S2.** Journals that coerce. A Linear Probability Model is performed with coercion (1 = journal identified as a coercer, 0 = journal not identified as a coercing journal) as the dependent variable. Independent variables are the total number of documents published by the journal in a year, average references per document in the journal, type of publisher (university presses as the reference category), academic disciplines (economics as the reference category), and the journal's rank in each discipline.

Independent variables	Probability of Coercion (SE)
Constant	-0.0800 (0.0755)
Total number of articles published 2008	0.002** (0.0003)
Average references per document	0.002** (0.001)
Commercial publisher (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.092* (0.044)
Academic association publisher (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.124* (0.055)
Sociology discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.065 (0.097)
Sociology journal rank	-0.0004 (0.001)
Psychology discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.017 (0.083)
Psychology journal rank	-0.001 (0.001)
Marketing discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.431** (0.112)
Marketing journal rank	-0.010** (0.003)
Management discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.3** (0.078)
Management journal rank	-0.003** (0.0004)
Finance discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.377** (0.114)
Finance journal rank	-0.007* (0.003)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.718** (0.138)
Information systems journal rank	-0.024** (0.006)
Accounting discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.293* (0.136)
Accounting journal rank	-0.014* (0.006)
Economics journal rank	-0.0004

	(0.001)
$R^2$	0.228
$F$	0.000
$N$	832

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$

**Table S3.** Incidence of coercion. A logistic regression is performed with coercion (0 = not coerced in the last five years, 1 = coerced at least once in the last five years) as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (assistant professor, associate professor, graduate student, and lecturer with professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (sociology, psychology, marketing, management, finance, information systems, and accounting with economics as the omitted category), gender, number of accepted papers within last five years, and number of co-authors on the most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on the most recently accepted paper. The first column gives estimated logit coefficients and second gives the marginal effects (dy/dx) are shown. The marginal effects can be interpreted as the change in the odds of being coerced based on a unit change in the independent variable.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	dy/dx (SE)
Constant	-1.830** (0.134)	
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.281** (0.095)	0.041** (0.014)
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.374** (0.099)	0.055** (0.144)
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.465 (0.246)	-0.068 (0.036)
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.168 (0.205)	-0.024 (0.029)
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.578** (0.172)	-0.084** (0.025)
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.921** (0.160)	-0.134** (0.023)
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.169** (0.133)	0.171** (0.019)
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.953** (0.130)	0.139** (0.019)
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.095** (0.164)	0.160** (0.024)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.071** (0.138)	0.156** (0.020)
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.339 (0.190)	0.049 (0.028)
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	0.174* (0.086)	-0.025* (0.013)
Number of accepted papers	0.042** (0.004)	0.006** (0.0006)
Number of coauthors	-0.150** (0.035)	-0.022** (0.005)
Log likelihood	-2232.945	
$\chi^2$	571.37**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.113	
$N$	4918	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S3A.** Tests of the stability of the results for incidence of coercion. Partitioning data by number of acceptances and re-estimating the model in Table S1. In general if a coefficient in the full model is significant, that variable is significant in several of the subgroups.

Independent variable	Full sample	Number of accepted manuscripts			
		1-3	4-6	7-10	11+
Constant	**	**	**	**	*
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**		**		
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	*	**	*	
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)					
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)					*
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**			**	**
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**			**	**
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	**	**	**	**
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	**	**	*	**
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	**	**	**	**
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	**	**	**	**
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)		**			
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	*	**		*	
Number of coauthors	**		**		**
<i>N</i>	4918	1182	1376	1123	1237

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .



**Table S3A1.** Incidence of coercion for authors with 1, 2, or 3 acceptances. A logistic regression is performed with coercion (0 = not coerced in the last five years, 1 = coerced at least once in the last five years) as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (assistant professor, associate professor, graduate student, and lecturer with professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (sociology, psychology, marketing, management, finance, information systems, and accounting with economics as the omitted category), gender, and number of co-authors on the most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on the most recently accepted paper. The first column gives estimated logit coefficients and second gives the marginal effects ( $dy/dx$ ) are shown. The marginal effects can be interpreted as the change in the odds of being coerced based on a unit change in the independent variable.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	$dy/dx$ (SE)
Constant	-3.193** (0.419)	
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.096 (0.327)	0.009 (0.029)
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.602* (0.278)	0.054* (0.025)
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-1.260 (0.760)	-0.112 (0.068)
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.304 (0.332)	0.027 (0.030)
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.291 (0.474)	0.026 (0.042)
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.477 (0.494)	0.043 (0.044)
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	2.019** (0.411)	0.180** (0.037)
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.835** (0.408)	0.164** (0.037)
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.605** (0.462)	0.143** (0.041)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.569** (0.449)	0.140** (0.040)
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.709** (0.468)	0.152** (0.042)
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	-0.590** (0.217)	-0.052** (0.019)
Number of coauthors	-0.054 (0.089)	-0.005 (0.008)
Log likelihood	-361.337	
$\chi^2$	88.01**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.109	
$N$	1182	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S3A2.** Incidence of coercion for authors with 4, 5, or 6 acceptances. A logistic regression is performed with coercion (0 = not coerced in the last five years, 1 = coerced at least once in the last five years) as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (assistant professor, associate professor, graduate student, and lecturer with professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (sociology, psychology, marketing, management, finance, information systems, and accounting with economics as the omitted category), gender, and number of co-authors on the most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on the most recently accepted paper. The first column gives estimated logit coefficients and second gives the marginal effects (dy/dx) are shown. The marginal effects can be interpreted as the change in the odds of being coerced based on a unit change in the independent variable.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	dy/dx (SE)
Constant	-1.941** (0.269)	
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.521** (0.189)	0.072** (0.026)
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.716** (0.190)	0.099** (0.026)
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.251 (0.467)	-0.035 (0.065)
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.486 (0.455)	0.067 (0.063)
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.326 (0.335)	-0.045 (0.046)
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.484 (0.338)	-0.067 (0.047)
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.124** (0.263)	0.156** (0.037)
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.894** (0.265)	0.124** (0.036)
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.122** (0.305)	0.156** (0.042)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.053** (0.287)	0.146** (0.039)
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.326 (0.349)	0.045 (0.048)
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	0.058 (0.161)	0.008 (0.022)
Number of coauthors	-0.208** (0.071)	-0.029** (0.010)
Log likelihood	-605.107	
$\chi^2$	91.06**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.070	
$N$	1376	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S3A3.** Incidence of coercion for authors with 7, 8, 9, or 10 acceptances. A logistic regression is performed with coercion (0 = not coerced in the last five years, 1 = coerced at least once in the last five years) as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (assistant professor, associate professor, graduate student, and lecturer with professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (sociology, psychology, marketing, management, finance, information systems, and accounting with economics as the omitted category), gender, and number of co-authors on the most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on the most recently accepted paper. The first column gives estimated logit coefficients and second gives the marginal effects (dy/dx) are shown. The marginal effects can be interpreted as the change in the odds of being coerced based on a unit change in the independent variable.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	<i>dy/dx</i> (SE)
Constant	-0.941** (0.242)	
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.227 (0.175)	0.038 (0.029)
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.468* (0.194)	0.077* (0.032)
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.042 (0.528)	0.007 (0.087)
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.373 (1.142)	-0.062 (0.189)
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-1.010** (0.328)	-0.167** (0.054)
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-2.118** (0.404)	-0.350** (0.066)
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.898** (0.246)	0.148** (0.040)
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.511* (0.240)	0.084* (0.039)
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.912** (0.302)	0.151** (0.049)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.736** (0.251)	0.122** (0.041)
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.044 (0.350)	0.007 (0.057)
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	-0.364* (0.176)	-0.060* (0.029)
Number of coauthors	-0.105 (0.074)	-0.017 (0.012)
Log likelihood	-553.937	
$\chi^2$	164.38**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.129	
<i>N</i>	1123	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S3A4.** Incidence of coercion for authors with 11 or more acceptances. A logistic regression is performed with coercion (0 = not coerced in the last five years, 1 = coerced at least once in the last five years) as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (assistant professor, associate professor, graduate student, and lecturer with professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (sociology, psychology, marketing, management, finance, information systems, and accounting with economics as the omitted category), gender, and number of co-authors on the most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on the most recently accepted paper. The first column gives estimated logit coefficients and second gives the marginal effects (dy/dx) are shown. The marginal effects can be interpreted as the change in the odds of being coerced based on a unit change in the independent variable.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	dy/dx (SE)
Constant	-0.518* (0.223)	
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.190 (0.168)	0.032 (0.029)
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.235 (0.205)	0.040 (0.035)
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.247 (0.515)	0.042 (0.088)
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	2.027* (1.034)	0.346* (0.175)
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-1.073** (0.343)	-0.183** (0.059)
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.944** (0.243)	-0.161** (0.041)
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.194** (0.256)	0.203** (0.042)
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.939** (0.236)	0.160** (0.039)
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.699** (0.448)	0.290** (0.075)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.078** (0.247)	0.184** (0.041)
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.375 (0.538)	-0.064 (0.092)
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	0.163 (0.170)	0.028 (0.029)
Number of coauthors	-0.235** (0.061)	-0.040** (0.010)
Log likelihood	-634.212	
$\chi^2$	230.63**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.154	
$N$	1237	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S4.** Journals that coerce. A logistic regression is performed with coercion (1 = journal identified as a coercer, 0 = journal not identified as a coercing journal) as the dependent variable. Independent variables are the total number of documents published by the journal in a year, average references per document in the journal, type of publisher (university presses as the reference category), academic disciplines (economics as the reference category), and the journal's rank in each discipline. Estimated coefficients and standard errors are followed by estimated marginal effects ( $dy/dx$ ).

Independent variables	Probability of Coercion (SE)
Constant	-3.539** (0.651)
Total number of articles published 2008	0.012** (0.002)
Average references per document	0.016** (0.006)
Commercial publisher (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.859* (0.415)
Academic association publisher (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.037* (0.478)
Sociology discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.457 (0.818)
Sociology journal rank	-0.008 (0.014)
Psychology discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.009 (0.612)
Psychology journal rank	-0.006 (0.004)
Marketing discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	2.233** (0.771)
Marketing journal rank	-0.059** (0.022)
Management discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.930** (0.580)
Management journal rank	-0.019** (0.004)
Finance discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.956** (0.753)
Finance journal rank	-0.036 (0.020)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	3.531** (1.061)
Information systems journal rank	-0.120* (0.048)
Accounting discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.709 (0.891)
Accounting journal rank	-0.096* (0.045)
Economics journal rank	-0.005

	(0.006)
Log likelihood	-335.19
$\chi^2$	185.58
Pseudo $R^2$	0.217
$N$	832

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$

**Table S5.** Number of times coerced. A negative binomial regression is performed with the number of times a respondent was coerced in the last five years as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (with full professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (with economics as the omitted category), gender, number of accepted papers within the last five years, and number of co-authors on most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on most recently accepted paper. Both coefficients and incidence rate ratios are shown.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	Incidence rate ratios
Constant	-1.586** (0.127)	0.205**
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.120 (0.088)	1.127
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.308** (0.093)	1.360**
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.211 (0.207)	0.809
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.148 (0.185)	0.862
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.588** (0.154)	0.555**
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.935** (0.141)	0.392**
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.007** (0.124)	2.736**
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.865** (0.120)	2.374**
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.984** (0.155)	2.675**
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.890** (0.128)	2.434**
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.249 (0.178)	1.282
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	0.091 (0.080)	0.912
Number of accepted papers	0.048** (0.004)	1.049**
Number of coauthors	-0.092** (0.033)	0.912**
Log likelihood	-3720.833	
X <sup>2</sup>	526.44**	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.066	
N	4917	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S5A.** Tests of the stability of the results for the frequency of coercion. Partitioning data by number of acceptances and re-estimating the model in Table S2. In general if a coefficient in the full model is significant, that variable is significant in several of the subgroups.

Independent variable	Full sample	Number of accepted manuscripts			
		1-3	4-6	7-10	11+
Constant	**	**	**	**	
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)					
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	*	**	*	
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)					
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)					
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**			**	**
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**			**	**
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	**	**	**	**
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	**	**	*	**
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	**	**	**	**
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	**	**	**	**	**
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)		**			
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)					
Number of coauthors	**				**
<i>N</i>	4917	1182	1376	1122	1237

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .



**Table S5A1.** Number of times coerced for authors with 1, 2, or 3 acceptances. A negative binomial regression is performed with the number of times a respondent was coerced in the last five years as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (with full professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (with economics as the omitted category), gender, and number of co-authors on most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on most recently accepted paper. Both coefficients and incidence rate ratios are shown.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	Incidence rate ratios
Constant	-3.154** (0.406)	0.043**
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.241 (0.327)	1.272
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.636* (0.287)	1.888*
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-1.528 (0.798)	0.217
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.432 (0.332)	1.540
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.105 (0.461)	1.111
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.539 (0.466)	1.714
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	2.057** (0.406)	7.822**
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	2.037** (0.397)	7.667**
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.490** (0.469)	4.439**
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.688** (0.438)	5.405**
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.519** (0.475)	4.570**
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	-0.385 (0.212)	0.680
Number of coauthors	-0.026 (0.086)	0.975
Log likelihood	-498.185	
$\chi^2$	88.97**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.082	
$N$	1182	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S5A2.** Number of times coerced for authors with 4, 5, or 6 acceptances. A negative binomial regression is performed with the number of times a respondent was coerced in the last five years as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (with full professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (with economics as the omitted category), gender, and number of co-authors on most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on most recently accepted paper. Both coefficients and incidence rate ratios are shown.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	Incidence rate ratios
Constant	-1.782** (0.259)	0.168**
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.218 (0.183)	1.244
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.557** (0.182)	1.746**
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.246 (0.440)	0.782
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.459 (0.425)	1.583
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.249 (0.315)	0.779
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.336 (0.313)	0.714
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.063** (0.258)	2.896**
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.900** (0.259)	2.459**
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.334** (0.298)	3.795**
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.066** (0.282)	2.903**
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.533 (0.330)	1.704
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	0.164 (0.156)	1.179
Number of coauthors	-0.119 (0.065)	0.888
Log likelihood	-919.205	
$\chi^2$	74.54**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.039	
$N$	1376	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S5A3.** Number of times coerced for authors with 7, 8, 9, or 10 acceptances. A negative binomial regression is performed with the number of times a respondent was coerced in the last five years as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (with full professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (with economics as the omitted category), gender, and number of co-authors on most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on most recently accepted paper. Both coefficients and incidence rate ratios are shown.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	Incidence rate ratios
Constant	-0.611** (0.219)	0.543**
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.045 (0.154)	0.956
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.403* (0.169)	1.496*
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.387 (0.433)	1.472
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.521 (0.951)	0.594
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.805** (0.271)	0.447**
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-2.163** (0.347)	0.115**
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.609** (0.218)	1.838**
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.480* (0.214)	1.615*
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.696** (0.265)	2.005**
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.574** (0.224)	1.776**
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.160 (0.321)	0.852
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	-0.290 (0.153)	0.748
Number of coauthors	-0.067 (0.070)	0.935
Log likelihood	-954.778	
$\chi^2$	147.74**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.072	
$N$	1122	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S5A4.** Number of times coerced for authors with 11 or more acceptances. A negative binomial regression is performed with the number of times a respondent was coerced in the last five years as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (with full professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (with economics as the omitted category), gender, and number of co-authors on most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on most recently accepted paper. Both coefficients and incidence rate ratios are shown.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	Incidence rate ratios
Constant	-0.142 (0.189)	0.867
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.164 (0.139)	1.178
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.077 (0.167)	1.080
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.577 (0.410)	1.780
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.239 (0.931)	3.453
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-1.123** (0.290)	0.325**
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.909** (0.203)	0.403**
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.027** (0.210)	2.794**
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.731** (0.197)	2.078**
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.199** (0.336)	3.318**
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.669** (0.205)	1.953**
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.150 (0.422)	0.861
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	0.007 (0.142)	1.007
Number of coauthors	-0.176** (0.052)	0.839**
Log likelihood	-1259.101	
$\chi^2$	200.08**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.074	
$N$	1237	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S5B.** Number of times coerced accounting for exposure. A negative binomial regression is performed with the number of times a respondent was coerced in the last five years as the dependent variable. The independent variables are academic ranks (with full professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (with economics as the omitted category), gender, number of co-authors on most recently coerced paper within last five years or, if not coerced, on most recently accepted paper. Exposure is modeled as the natural log of the number of times an author has papers accepted for publication in the five years. Both coefficients and incidence rate ratios are shown.

Independent variable	Coefficients (SE)	Incidence rate ratios
Constant	-3.171** (0.119)	0.042**
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.193* (0.088)	1.213*
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.593** (0.090)	1.811**
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.023 (0.215)	1.023
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.800** (0.181)	2.226**
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.656** (0.157)	0.519**
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-1.070** (0.140)	0.343**
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.042** (0.125)	2.834**
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.818** (0.121)	2.267**
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.126** (0.155)	3.083**
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.839** (0.129)	2.315**
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.402* (0.180)	1.495*
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	-0.018 (0.080)	0.923
Number of coauthors	-0.132** (0.033)	0.876**
Exposure (ln(acceptances))	Constrained to = 1	Constrained to = 1
Log likelihood	-3668.364	
$\chi^2$	491.61**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.063	
$N$	4917	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S6.** Journals that coerce. A negative binomial regression is performed with the number of respondents reporting the journal as a coercer as the dependent variable. Independent variables are the total number of documents published by the journal in a year, average references per document in the journal, type of publisher (university presses as the reference category), academic disciplines (with economics as the reference category), and the journal's rank in each discipline. Estimated coefficients and standard errors are followed by the incidence rate ratio.

Independent variables	Full journal sample		Top 30 journals from each discipline	
	Coefficients (SE)	Incidence rate ratios	Coefficients (SE)	Incidence rate ratios
Constant	-3.084** (0.599)	0.046**	-2.669* (1.179)	0.069*
Total number of articles published 2008	0.010** (0.002)	1.010**	0.007** (0.002)	1.007**
Average references per document	0.008 (0.006)	1.008	-0.004 (0.008)	0.996
Commercial publisher (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.23** (0.396)	3.429**	0.751 (0.538)	2.119
Academic association publisher (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.163** (0.446)	3.198**	0.812 (0.583)	2.253
Sociology discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.397 (0.740)	0.672	1.160 (1.414)	3.190
Sociology journal rank	-0.10 (0.012)	0.991	-0.088 (0.069)	0.916
Psychology discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.473 (0.562)	1.608	1.543 (1.371)	4.678
Psychology journal rank	-0.010* (0.004)	0.990*	-0.011 (0.049)	0.989
Marketing discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	3.026** (0.589)	20.610**	5.171** (1.243)	176.008**
Marketing journal rank	-0.070** (0.016)	0.932**	-0.182** (0.046)	0.834**
Management discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	2.093** (0.529)	7.998**	3.554** (1.203)	34.943**
Management journal rank	-0.023** (0.004)	0.978**	-0.049 (0.032)	0.952
Finance discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.811** (0.657)	6.118**	2.822* (1.216)	16.815*
Finance journal rank	-0.039* (0.018)	0.962*	-0.063 (0.039)	0.939
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	2.723** (0.723)	15.221**	3.420** (1.177)	30.565**
Information systems journal rank	-0.098** (0.033)	0.906**	-0.090** (0.033)	0.914**
Accounting discipline (0 = no, 1 = yes)	1.740 (0.989)	5.699	1.846 (1.327)	6.331
Accounting journal rank	-0.086 (0.050)	0.917	-0.043 (0.051)	0.958
Economics journal rank	-0.005 (0.005)	0.995	0.013 (0.055)	1.013

Log likelihood	-631.069	-311.796
$\chi^2$	223.19**	99.00**
Pseudo $R^2$	0.150	0.137
$N$	832	240

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ .

**Table S7.** Inappropriateness of coercion and opinions of prestige. Ordinal logistic regressions are performed with appropriateness of coercion (measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = extremely appropriate and 5 = extremely inappropriate) and whether coercion reduces the prestige of a journal in the opinion of the respondent (measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree that coercion reduces prestige and 5 = strongly agree coercion reduces prestige) as separate dependent variables. The independent variables are academic ranks (full professor as the omitted reference category), academic disciplines (economics as the omitted category), gender, number of accepted papers in the last five years, whether the respondent is aware of coercion, whether the respondent has been coerced in the last five years, number of times respondent has been coerced, and number of citations added in most recent case of coercion.

Independent variable	Inappropriateness of coercion		Coercion reduces the prestige of journal	
	Coefficients (SE)	dy/dx (SE)	Coefficients (SE)	dy/dx (SE)
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.296** (0.073)	-0.069** (0.017)	-0.288** (0.070)	-0.066** (0.016)
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.394** (0.075)	-0.092** (0.017)	-0.470** (0.072)	-0.108** (0.016)
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.292 (0.159)	-0.068 (0.037)	-0.278 (0.152)	-0.064 (0.035)
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.475** (0.123)	-0.111** (0.029)	-0.465** (0.118)	-0.107** (0.027)
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.370** (0.106)	-0.087** (0.025)	-0.424** (0.101)	-0.097** (0.023)
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.088 (0.097)	0.021 (0.023)	-0.129 (0.091)	-0.030 (0.021)
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.437** (0.108)	-0.102** (0.025)	-0.392** (0.106)	-0.090** (0.024)
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.408** (0.102)	-0.095** (0.024)	-0.428** (0.099)	-0.098** (0.023)
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.613** (0.137)	-0.143** (0.032)	-0.612** (0.132)	-0.141** (0.030)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.319** (0.112)	-0.075** (0.026)	-0.074 (0.109)	-0.017 (0.025)
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.468** (0.138)	-0.110** (0.032)	-0.468** (0.135)	-0.107** (0.031)
Gender (0 = female 1 = male)	-0.130* (0.062)	-0.030* (0.014)	-0.187** (0.060)	-0.043** (0.014)
Number of accepted papers	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)
Aware of coercion (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.612** (0.069)	-0.143** (0.035)	-0.406** (0.067)	-0.093** (0.015)
Have been coerced (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.262 (0.149)	0.061 (0.035)	0.154 (0.144)	0.035 (0.033)
Number of times coerced	-0.086 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.012)	-0.042 (0.046)	-0.010 (0.011)
Number of citations added due to coercion	-0.104** (0.036)	-0.024** (0.008)	-0.145** (0.035)	-0.033** (0.008)
Log likelihood	-5218.532		-5921.236	
$\chi^2$	352.99**		286.86**	



Pseudo $R^2$	0.033	0.024
$N$	4900	4900

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S8.** Reactions to coercion. Ordered logit models are estimated with dependent variables being less likely to submit to a coercive journal (measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree) and whether respondents are likely to add citations before submission (measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). Independent variables include academic rank (full professor is the omitted reference group), discipline (economics is the omitted reference group), gender, awareness of coercion, whether or not the respondent had been coerced within last five years, how many times coerced in last five years and number of citations the respondent added to an article after being coerced.

Independent variable	Less likely to submit to a coercive journal		Likely to add journal specific citations before submission	
	Coefficients (SE)	$dy/dx$ (SE)	Coefficients (SE)	$dy/dx$ (SE)
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.254** (0.068)	-0.048** (0.013)	0.433** (0.068)	0.051** (0.008)
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.584** (0.070)	-0.109** (0.013)	0.756** (0.071)	0.090** (0.009)
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.455** (0.153)	-0.085* (0.029)	0.479** (0.152)	0.057** (0.018)
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.625** (0.115)	0.117** (0.021)	0.668** (0.118)	0.079** (0.014)
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.226* (0.098)	0.042* (0.018)	-0.157 (0.099)	-0.019 (0.012)
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.168 (0.087)	0.031 (0.016)	-0.371** (0.088)	-0.044** (0.011)
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.622** (0.102)	-0.116** (0.019)	0.219* (0.103)	0.026 (0.012)
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.423** (0.096)	-0.079** (0.018)	0.176 (0.097)	0.021 (0.011)
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.733** (0.128)	-0.137** (0.024)	-0.074 (0.131)	-0.009 (0.016)
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.111 (0.104)	0.021 (0.019)	-0.113 (0.106)	-0.013 (0.013)
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.520** (0.131)	-0.097** (0.024)	0.343* (0.135)	0.041* (0.016)
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	-0.158** (0.058)	-0.030* (0.011)	0.423** (0.059)	-0.050** (0.007)
Number of accepted papers	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.0003 (0.0006)	0.000 (0.003)	0.0001 (0.0003)
Aware of coercion (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.575** (0.065)	-0.107** (0.012)	0.527** (0.066)	0.063** (0.008)
Have been coerced (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.219 (0.143)	0.041 (0.028)	-0.338* (0.145)	-0.040* (0.017)
Number of times coerced	-0.061 (0.046)	0.011 (0.008)	0.050 (0.044)	0.006 (0.005)
Number of citations added due to coercion	-0.175** (0.035)	0.033** (0.007)	0.169** (0.036)	0.020** (0.0001)
Log likelihood	-6728.205		-6943.895	
$\chi^2$	548.27**		479.01**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.039		0.033	
$N$	4900		4900	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table S9.** Number of citations added because of coercion. A negative binomial model with the dependent variable being the number of citations authors decide to add in response to coercion. Independent variables include academic rank (full professor is the omitted reference group), discipline (economics is the omitted reference group), gender, number of accepted papers in the last five years, number of times coerced in last five years and number of co-authors on most recently coerced paper within last five years. Estimated coefficients and standard errors are followed by the incidence rate ratio.

Independent Variable	Coefficients (SE)	Incidence rate ratios
Constant	0.593** (0.080)	
Associate professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.101* (0.049)	1.106*
Assistant professor (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.117* (0.051)	1.124*
Lecturer (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.001 (0.137)	1.001
Graduate student (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.319** (0.104)	1.376**
Sociology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.003 (0.103)	1.003
Psychology (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.268** (0.101)	0.765**
Marketing (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.328** (0.070)	1.389**
Management (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.055 (0.072)	1.056
Finance (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.103 (0.087)	1.109
Information systems (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.037 (0.074)	1.038
Accounting (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.067 (0.114)	0.935
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	0.036 (0.045)	1.037
Number of accepted papers	0.001 (0.002)	1.001
Number of times coerced	0.044** (0.013)	1.045**
Number of coauthors	0.048* (0.019)	1.049*
Log likelihood	-1871.878	
$\chi^2$	100.48**	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.026	
$N$	1008	

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

**Table S10.** Population versus sample demographics: The first number in each cell is the percentage of individuals in the population with that cell's demographic characteristic and the second number is the percentage of the sample's population with that characteristic.

	<b>% females population / sample</b>	<b>%Professor population / sample</b>	<b>% Asso. Prof population / sample</b>	<b>% Asst. Prof. population / sample</b>
<b>Economics</b>	20.9 / 19.8	50.1 / 50.8	24.1 / 23.6	25.8 / 25.6
<b>Management</b>	39.0 / 34.1	35.0 / 36.9	29.0 / 31.5	36.0 / 31.6
<b>Accounting</b>	37.4 / 40.2	21.7 / 29.6	42.8 / 44.3	35.5 / 26.1
<b>Sociology</b>	50.6 / 51.3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Psychology</b>	57.0 / 42.8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>IS</b>	29.2 / 25.9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

**Table S11.** Mean responses for early and late responders. Averages of the early responders (first quartile) are on top and below in parentheses are the averages for late responders (last quartile). Stars indicate a significant difference (means test) between the two groups. There are no systematic differences.

	Aware of coercion (Q 1)	Coerced (Q 3)	Number of accepted papers (Q 15)	Coercion reduces prestige (Q 9)	Less likely to submit to coercive journals (Q 10)	Add cites before submission (Q 11)
Economics	0.33 (0.34)	0.12* (0.21)	6.44 (7.38)	4.32 (4.26)	3.90 (4.02)	3.37 (3.28)
Psychology	0.29* (0.16)	0.12* (0.04)	15.05* (10.79)	4.23 (4.27)	4.07 (4.08)	3.04 (2.94)
Sociology	0.31* (0.19)	0.07 (0.06)	5.40 (6.53)	4.08 (4.08)	3.81 (3.73)	3.54* (3.22)
Marketing	0.72* (0.52)	0.38* (0.24)	7.94 (8.54)	3.95 (4.04)	3.41 (3.58)	3.56 (3.44)
Management	0.66 (0.57)	0.38* (0.25)	10.62* (8.30)	3.92 (4.07)	3.56 (3.68)	3.65 (3.61)
Information systems	0.73 (0.67)	0.39 (0.29)	12.14* (8.68)	4.05 (3.89)	3.43 (3.50)	3.56 (3.41)
Finance	0.56 (0.46)	0.33 (0.23)	6.31 (5.13)	4.34* (3.89)	3.63 (3.32)	3.31 (3.35)
Accounting	0.37 (0.31)	0.19 (0.15)	6.15 (6.13)	4.00 (4.18)	3.58 (3.60)	3.68 (3.69)

\* $p < .05$ .

**Table S12.** Journals identified as coercers by survey respondents. Number of coercive observations represents the number of times a journal was identified by independent survey respondents as requesting self citations that (i) give no indication that the manuscript was lacking in attribution, (ii) make no suggestion as to specific articles, authors, or a body of work requiring review, and (iii) only guide authors to add citations from the editor’s journal. Ties are listed alphabetically.

Journal Title	Number of Coercive Observations
<i>Journal of Business Research</i>	49
<i>Journal of Retailing</i>	43
<i>Marketing Science</i>	29
<i>Journal of Banking and Finance</i>	24
<i>Information and Management</i>	19
<i>Applied Economics</i>	18
<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>	14
<i>Group and Organization Management</i>	13
<i>Journal of Consumer Psychology</i>	9
<i>Psychology and Marketing</i>	8
<i>Journal of Accounting and Public Policy</i>	7
<i>Journal of Financial Economics</i>	7
<i>Academy of Management Review</i>	6
<i>British Journal of Management</i>	6
<i>Financial Management</i>	6
<i>Journal of Management Information Systems</i>	6
<i>Journal of Management Studies</i>	6
<i>Organization Science</i>	6
<i>Production and Operations Management</i>	6
<i>Strategic Management Journal</i>	6
<i>Asia Pacific Journal of Management</i>	5
<i>Decision Support Systems</i>	5
<i>European Journal of Political Economy</i>	5
<i>Industrial Management and Data Systems</i>	5
<i>Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science</i>	5
<i>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes</i>	5
<i>Information Systems Journal</i>	4
<i>International Journal of Production Economics</i>	4
<i>Journal of Business Ethics</i>	4
<i>Journal of Corporate Finance</i>	4
<i>Journal of Operations Management</i>	4
<i>Long Range Planning</i>	4
<i>Sex Roles</i>	4
<i>Academy of Management Perspectives</i>	3
<i>Applied Economics Letters</i>	3
<i>Contemporary Accounting Research</i>	3
<i>European Financial Management</i>	3
<i>Industrial Marketing Management</i>	3
<i>Information Systems Frontiers</i>	3
<i>Information Systems Research</i>	3

<i>International Journal of Research in Marketing</i>	3
<i>Journal of Business Venturing</i>	3
<i>Journal of Consumer Affairs</i>	3
<i>Journal of Consumer Research</i>	3
<i>Journal of Database Management</i>	3
<i>Journal of Experimental Psychology: General</i>	3
<i>Journal of Financial Research</i>	3
<i>Journal of Policy Analysis and Management</i>	3
<i>Journal of Small Business Management</i>	3
<i>Journal of Social and Personal Relationships</i>	3
<i>Journal of Vocational Behavior</i>	3
<i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i>	2
<i>American Sociological Review</i>	2
<i>Decision Sciences</i>	2
<i>Developmental Psychology</i>	2
<i>Electronic Government</i>	2
<i>Emerging Markets Finance and Trade</i>	2
<i>European Journal of Operational Research</i>	2
<i>International Business Review</i>	2
<i>International Journal of Logistics Systems and Management</i>	2
<i>International Journal of Production Research</i>	2
<i>International Journal of Technology Management</i>	2
<i>Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis</i>	2
<i>Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing</i>	2
<i>Journal of Consumer Behaviour</i>	2
<i>Journal of Economic Studies</i>	2
<i>Journal of Engineering and Technology Management - JET-M</i>	2
<i>Journal of Interactive Marketing</i>	2
<i>Journal of International Business Studies</i>	2
<i>Journal of Macromarketing</i>	2
<i>Journal of Management</i>	2
<i>Journal of Sexual Medicine</i>	2
<i>Knowledge Management Research and Practice</i>	2
<i>Management Learning</i>	2
<i>Marketing Management</i>	2
<i>Organization Studies</i>	2
<i>Psychological Reports</i>	2
<i>Psychology of Women Quarterly</i>	2
<i>Public Budgeting and Finance</i>	2
<i>Public Choice</i>	2
<i>Review of Development Economics</i>	2
<i>Sociological Forum</i>	2
<i>Accounting Review</i>	1
<i>American Economic Review</i>	1
<i>American Psychologist</i>	1
<i>Annual Review of Psychology</i>	1
<i>Applied Financial Economics Letters</i>	1
<i>Applied Psychology</i>	1



<i>Armed Forces and Society</i>	1
<i>Auditing</i>	1
<i>Behaviour and Information Technology</i>	1
<i>British Journal of Social Psychology</i>	1
<i>Business and Society</i>	1
<i>Cognition and Emotion</i>	1
<i>Comparative Sociology</i>	1
<i>Current Directions in Psychological Science</i>	1
<i>Data and Knowledge Engineering</i>	1
<i>Demography</i>	1
<i>Deviant Behavior</i>	1
<i>Eastern Economic Journal</i>	1
<i>Economica</i>	1
<i>Economics Letters</i>	1
<i>Emotion</i>	1
<i>European Journal of Innovation Management</i>	1
<i>Feminist Economics</i>	1
<i>Financial Analysts Journal</i>	1
<i>Gender and Society</i>	1
<i>Gender, Work and Organization</i>	1
<i>Group Dynamics</i>	1
<i>Harvard business review</i>	1
<i>Human Resource Management</i>	1
<i>Industry and Innovation</i>	1
<i>Informing Science</i>	1
<i>International Journal of Accounting Information Systems</i>	1
<i>International Journal of Business Information Systems</i>	1
<i>International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research</i>	1
<i>International Journal of Human Resource Management</i>	1
<i>International Journal of Market Research</i>	1
<i>International Journal of Operations and Production Management</i>	1
<i>International Journal of Selection and Assessment</i>	1
<i>International Marketing Review</i>	1
<i>International Small Business Journal</i>	1
<i>International Tax and Public Finance</i>	1
<i>International Trade Journal</i>	1
<i>Journal of Accounting and Economics</i>	1
<i>Journal of Advertising</i>	1
<i>Journal of Applied Business Research</i>	1
<i>Journal of Applied Economics</i>	1
<i>Journal of Applied Psychology</i>	1
<i>Journal of Applied Social Psychology</i>	1
<i>Journal of Bioeconomics</i>	1
<i>Journal of Business Finance and Accounting</i>	1
<i>Journal of Consumer Culture</i>	1
<i>Journal of Counseling and Development</i>	1

<i>Journal of Criminal Justice</i>	1
<i>Journal of Economic Growth</i>	1
<i>Journal of Finance</i>	1
<i>Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis</i>	1
<i>Journal of Financial Stability</i>	1
<i>Journal of Information Technology</i>	1
<i>Journal of International Management</i>	1
<i>Journal of Law and Economics</i>	1
<i>Journal of Management and Organization</i>	1
<i>Journal of Managerial Issues</i>	1
<i>Journal of Marketing</i>	1
<i>Journal of Monetary Economics</i>	1
<i>Journal of Risk and Insurance</i>	1
<i>Journal of Risk and Uncertainty</i>	1
<i>Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development</i>	1
<i>Journal of the Operational Research Society</i>	1
<i>Journal of World Business</i>	1
<i>Knowledge-Based Systems</i>	1
<i>Management Science</i>	1
<i>Memory and Cognition</i>	1
<i>MIS Quarterly: Management Information Systems</i>	1
<i>Omega</i>	1
<i>Organization</i>	1
<i>Organizational Research Methods</i>	1
<i>Personality and Individual Differences</i>	1
<i>Personnel Psychology</i>	1
<i>Psychology, Public Policy, and Law</i>	1
<i>Quantitative Finance</i>	1
<i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>	1
<i>Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance</i>	1
<i>Review of Economics of the Household</i>	1
<i>Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting</i>	1
<i>Small Business Economics</i>	1
<i>Small Group Research</i>	1
<i>Social Psychology Quarterly</i>	1
<i>Social Science and Medicine</i>	1
<i>Sociological Inquiry</i>	1
<i>Supply Chain Management</i>	1
<i>Work and Occupations</i>	1
<i>Work and Stress</i>	1
<i>World Economy</i>	1

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