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    A Simple Public-Key Cryptosystem with a Double Trapdoor Decryption Mechanism and Its Applications

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    At Eurocrypt'02 Cramer and Shoup 37 proposed a general paradigm to construct practical public-key cryptosystems secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks as well as several concrete examples. Among the others they presented a variant of Paillier's 21 scheme achieving such a strong security requirement and for which two, independent, decryption mechanisms are allowed. In this paper we revisit such scheme and show that by considering a different subgroup, one can obtain a different scheme (whose security can be proved with respect to a different mathematical assumption) that allows for interesting applications. In particular we show how to construct a perfectly hiding commitment schemes that allows for an on-line off-line efficiency tradeoff. The scheme is computationally binding under the assumption that factoring is hard, thus improving on the previous construction by Catalano et al. 5 whose binding property was based on the assumption that inverting mathrmRSAN,N (i.e. RSA with the public exponent set to N) is hard.

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    Description

    Title : A Simple Public-Key Cryptosystem with a Double Trapdoor Decryption Mechanism and Its Applications
    Author(s) : Emmanuel Bresson, Dario Catalano, David Pointcheval
    Abstract : At Eurocrypt'02 Cramer and Shoup 37 proposed a general paradigm to construct practical public-key cryptosystems secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks as well as several concrete examples. Among the others they presented a variant of Paillier's 21 scheme achieving such a strong security requirement and for which two, independent, decryption mechanisms are allowed. In this paper we revisit such scheme and show that by considering a different subgroup, one can obtain a different scheme (whose security can be proved with respect to a different mathematical assumption) that allows for interesting applications. In particular we show how to construct a perfectly hiding commitment schemes that allows for an on-line off-line efficiency tradeoff. The scheme is computationally binding under the assumption that factoring is hard, thus improving on the previous construction by Catalano et al. 5 whose binding property was based on the assumption that inverting mathrmRSAN,N (i.e. RSA with the public exponent set to N) is hard.
    Subject : unspecified
    Area : Other
    Language : English
    Year : 2003

    Affiliations ENS, Paris, France
    Editors : Chi-Sung Laih
    Journal : Advances
    Volume : 03
    Issue : december
    Publisher : Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
    Pages : 37-54
    Url : http://www.springerlink.com/content/g9n5v2mnv1l99ydr/
    Doi : 10.1007/978-3-540-40061-5_3

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