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    Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information

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    We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only has partial information about the votes of the nonmanipulators. Such partial information is described by an information set, which is the set of profiles of the nonmanipulators that are indistinguishable to the manipulator. Given such an information set, a dominating manipulation is a non-truthful vote that the manipulator can cast which makes the winner at least as preferable (and sometimes more preferable) as the winner when the manipulator votes truthfully. When the manipulator has full information, computing whether or not there exists a dominating manipulation is in P for many common voting rules (by known results). We show that when the manipulator has no information, there is no dominating manipulation for many common voting rules. When the manipulator's information is represented by partial orders and only a small portion of the preferences are unknown, computing a dominating manipulation is NP-hard for many common voting rules. Our results thus throw light on whether we can prevent strategic behavior by limiting information about the votes of other voters.

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    Description

    Title : Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information
    Author(s) : Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia
    Abstract : We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only has partial information about the votes of the nonmanipulators. Such partial information is described by an information set, which is the set of profiles of the nonmanipulators that are indistinguishable to the manipulator. Given such an information set, a dominating manipulation is a non-truthful vote that the manipulator can cast which makes the winner at least as preferable (and sometimes more preferable) as the winner when the manipulator votes truthfully. When the manipulator has full information, computing whether or not there exists a dominating manipulation is in P for many common voting rules (by known results). We show that when the manipulator has no information, there is no dominating manipulation for many common voting rules. When the manipulator's information is represented by partial orders and only a small portion of the preferences are unknown, computing a dominating manipulation is NP-hard for many common voting rules. Our results thus throw light on whether we can prevent strategic behavior by limiting information about the votes of other voters.
    Subject : unspecified
    Area : Other
    Language : English
    Year : 2011

    Affiliations NICTA and UNSW
    Journal : Artificial Intelligence
    Pages : 7
    Url : http://arxiv.org/abs/1106.5448

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