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    Time and the Prisoner's Dilemma

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    This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational ability is sufficient to enable cooperative behavior. In addition, a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game is suggested, in which players have the choice of opting out. This modification enriches the game and suggests dominance of cooperative strategies. Competitive analysis is suggested as a tool for investigating sub-optimal (but computationally tractable) strategies and game theoretic models in general. Using competitive analysis, it is shown that for bounded players, a sub-optimal strategy might be the optimal choice, given resource limitations.

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    Description

    Title : Time and the Prisoner's Dilemma
    Author(s) : Yishay Mor, Jeffrey S Rosenschein
    Abstract : This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational ability is sufficient to enable cooperative behavior. In addition, a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game is suggested, in which players have the choice of opting out. This modification enriches the game and suggests dominance of cooperative strategies. Competitive analysis is suggested as a tool for investigating sub-optimal (but computationally tractable) strategies and game theoretic models in general. Using competitive analysis, it is shown that for bounded players, a sub-optimal strategy might be the optimal choice, given resource limitations.
    Keywords : learning gametheory ai dilemma multiagent my priso

    Subject : unspecified
    Area : Other
    Language : English
    Year : 2007

    Affiliations Institute of Educational Technology, Open University, UK
    Journal : Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multiagent
    Publisher : AAAI Press / MIT Press
    Pages : 276-282
    Url : http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0701139

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    Yishay's Peer Evaluation activity

    Trusted by 1
    Views 34
    Collected by 1
    • Yishay Mor, Lecturer, Institute of Educational Technology, Open University, UK.
    Followed by 4
    • Derek Jones, Lecturer, Open University.
    • Jill Jameson, Professor, University of Greenwich, Centre for Leadership and Enterprise.
    • Srdjan Verbić, Independent researcher, Inst. for Educ. Quality and Evaluation, Belgrade.
    • Keith Jones, Associate Professor, University of Southampton.

    Yishay has...

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    • Yishay Mor, Lecturer, Institute of Educational Technology, Open University, UK.
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