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    Institute of Educational Technology, Open University, UK

    Learn Your Opponent's Strategy (in Polynomial Time)!

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    Agents that interact in a distributed environment might increase their utility by behaving optimally given the strategies of the other agents. To do so, agents need to learn about those with whom they share the same world. This paper examines interactions among agents from a game theoretic perspective. In this context, learning has been assumed as a means to reach equilibrium. We analyze the complexity of this learning process. We start with a restricted two-agent model, in which agents are represented by finite automata, and one of the agents plays a fixed strategy. We show that even with this restrictions, the learning process may be exponential in time. We then suggest a criterion of simplicity, that induces a class of automata that are learnable in polynomial time.

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    Description

    Title : Learn Your Opponent's Strategy (in Polynomial Time)!
    Author(s) : Yishay Mor, Claudia V Goldman, J Rosenschein
    Abstract : Agents that interact in a distributed environment might increase their utility by behaving optimally given the strategies of the other agents. To do so, agents need to learn about those with whom they share the same world. This paper examines interactions among agents from a game theoretic perspective. In this context, learning has been assumed as a means to reach equilibrium. We analyze the complexity of this learning process. We start with a restricted two-agent model, in which agents are represented by finite automata, and one of the agents plays a fixed strategy. We show that even with this restrictions, the learning process may be exponential in time. We then suggest a criterion of simplicity, that induces a class of automata that are learnable in polynomial time.
    Subject : unspecified
    Area : Other
    Language : English
    Year : 1996

    Affiliations Institute of Educational Technology, Open University, UK
    Editors : Gerhard Weiss, Sandip Sen
    Volume : 1042
    Publisher : Springer
    Pages : 164-176
    Url : http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/3-540-60923-7_26
    Doi : 10.1007/3-540-60923-7_26

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    Yishay's Peer Evaluation activity

    Trusted by 1
    Downloads 1
    Views 34
    Collected by 1
    • Yishay Mor, Lecturer, Institute of Educational Technology, Open University, UK.
    Followed by 4
    • Derek Jones, Lecturer, Open University.
    • Jill Jameson, Professor, University of Greenwich, Centre for Leadership and Enterprise.
    • Srdjan Verbić, Independent researcher, Inst. for Educ. Quality and Evaluation, Belgrade.
    • Keith Jones, Associate Professor, University of Southampton.

    Yishay has...

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    • Yishay Mor, Lecturer, Institute of Educational Technology, Open University, UK.
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