Reading PAGE

Peer Evaluation activity

Downloads 1223
Views 20
Following... 1

Total impact ?

    Send a

    Marcin has...

    Trusted 0
    Reviewed 0
    Emailed 0
    Shared/re-used 0
    Discussed 0
    Invited 0
    Collected 0

     

    This was brought to you by:

    block this user Marcin Miłkowski

    Assistant Professor

    Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, Warszawa
    Instytut Podstaw Informatyki PAN, Warszawa

    Is the mind a Turing machine? How could we tell?

    Export to Mendeley

    In many philosophical discussions, it is assumed that the computational explanation of the mind implies that it is being explained as a Universal Turing Machine (UTM). The reason why it is being proposed as a model of the mind is that it is the standard model of computation, and that is a universal machine – i.e., any other digital computer might be simulated by the UTM. So if the mind is a computer that is not able to compute everything that the UTM can, the UTM might still simulate it.�In recent years, several criticisms to such a proposal have been raised. First, it was argued that the UTM requires an infinite tape, which is something that is impossible physically (or impossible as a physical part of the brain). Second, it was argued that the UTM is not a good candidate for explaining the intricacies of the human mind as it has a completely different architecture: so, while the set of functions computed by the machine could be the same as the one computed by the mind, it would differ dramatically in terms of speed and space requirements. Third, some have claimed that there are physical systems capable of hyper-Turing computation, so the UTM might not be the strongest model of computation available.�In my talk, I want to focus on the epistemic question: how could one tell that a physical system is a UTM? I will distinguish two senses in which one could say that a physical system “is” a UTM: (1) when a physical system has a function that could be simulated with a UTM (functional sense); (2) when a physical system is a mechanism best described as a UTM (mechanistic sense). I will enumerate conditions that must be fulfilled to qualify a physical system to be a UTM in both senses and show differences between the two. It will turn out that in the functional sense, many physical systems might be UTMs, whereas in the mechanistic sense, the set will be much restricted. I will also discuss the problem of finiteness: it seems that for many algorithms, the tape length is restricted anyway (especially if the restriction of the input value range is the part of the algorithm), so the finiteness might not be the biggest problem. Moreover, in the mechanistic sense, one does not select the model of computation simply by picking the strongest model possible, so the hyper-Turing models must also match the mental mechanisms as strictly as any other descriptions of mechanisms that we posit in science.�The mind does not seem to be a UTM in the mechanistic sense at all because of its architecture; and proper computational explanations in cognitive science require that the architecture is matched strictly. I will discuss the problem of the required level of detail in mechanistic computational explanations: it transpires that the philosophically popular UTM is not a good candidate for a scientific model of the mind, even if we accept the standard computational theory of mind.�

    Oh la laClose

    Your session has expired but don’t worry, your message
    has been saved.Please log in and we’ll bring you back
    to this page. You’ll just need to click “Send”.

    Your evaluation is of great value to our authors and readers. Many thanks for your time.

    Review Close

    Short review
    Select a comment
    Select a grade
    You and the author
    Anonymity My review is anonymous( Log in  or  Register )
    publish
    Close

    When you're done, click "publish"

    Only blue fields are mandatory.

    Relation to the author*
    Overall Comment*
    Anonymity* My review is anonymous( Log in  or  Register )
     

    Focus & Objectives*

    Have the objectives and the central topic been clearly introduced?

    Novelty & Originality*

    Do you consider this work to be an interesting contribution to knowledge?

    Arrangement, Transition and Logic

    Are the different sections of this work well arranged and distributed?

    Methodology & Results

    Is the author's methodology relevant to both the objectives and the results?

    Data Settings & Figures

    Were tables and figures appropriate and well conceived?

    References and bibliography

    Is this work well documented and has the bibliography been properly established?

    Writing

    Is this work well written, checked and edited?

    Write Your Review (you can paste text as well)
    Please be civil and constructive. Thank you.


    Grade (optional, N/A by default)

    N/A 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
    Close

    Your mailing list is currently empty.
    It will build up as you send messages
    and links to your peers.

     No one besides you has access to this list.
    Close
    Enter the e-mail addresses of your recipients in the box below.  Note: Peer Evaluation will NOT store these email addresses   log in
    Your recipients

    Your message:

    Your email : Your email address will not be stored or shared with others.

    Your message has been sent.

    Description

    Title : Is the mind a Turing machine? How could we tell?
    Author(s) : Marcin Miłkowski
    Abstract : In many philosophical discussions, it is assumed that the computational explanation of the mind implies that it is being explained as a Universal Turing Machine (UTM). The reason why it is being proposed as a model of the mind is that it is the standard model of computation, and that is a universal machine – i.e., any other digital computer might be simulated by the UTM. So if the mind is a computer that is not able to compute everything that the UTM can, the UTM might still simulate it.�In recent years, several criticisms to such a proposal have been raised. First, it was argued that the UTM requires an infinite tape, which is something that is impossible physically (or impossible as a physical part of the brain). Second, it was argued that the UTM is not a good candidate for explaining the intricacies of the human mind as it has a completely different architecture: so, while the set of functions computed by the machine could be the same as the one computed by the mind, it would differ dramatically in terms of speed and space requirements. Third, some have claimed that there are physical systems capable of hyper-Turing computation, so the UTM might not be the strongest model of computation available.�In my talk, I want to focus on the epistemic question: how could one tell that a physical system is a UTM? I will distinguish two senses in which one could say that a physical system “is” a UTM: (1) when a physical system has a function that could be simulated with a UTM (functional sense); (2) when a physical system is a mechanism best described as a UTM (mechanistic sense). I will enumerate conditions that must be fulfilled to qualify a physical system to be a UTM in both senses and show differences between the two. It will turn out that in the functional sense, many physical systems might be UTMs, whereas in the mechanistic sense, the set will be much restricted. I will also discuss the problem of finiteness: it seems that for many algorithms, the tape length is restricted anyway (especially if the restriction of the input value range is the part of the algorithm), so the finiteness might not be the biggest problem. Moreover, in the mechanistic sense, one does not select the model of computation simply by picking the strongest model possible, so the hyper-Turing models must also match the mental mechanisms as strictly as any other descriptions of mechanisms that we posit in science.�The mind does not seem to be a UTM in the mechanistic sense at all because of its architecture; and proper computational explanations in cognitive science require that the architecture is matched strictly. I will discuss the problem of the required level of detail in mechanistic computational explanations: it transpires that the philosophically popular UTM is not a good candidate for a scientific model of the mind, even if we accept the standard computational theory of mind.�
    Keywords : Turing machine; mind; computationalism; hypercomputation

    Subject : computationalism
    Area : Philosophy
    Language : English
    Affiliations Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, Warszawa
    Attribution Non Commercial

    Leave a comment

    This contribution has not been reviewed yet. review?

    You may receive the Trusted member label after :

    • Reviewing 10 uploads, whatever the media type.
    • Being trusted by 10 peers.
    • If you are blocked by 10 peers the "Trust label" will be suspended from your page. We encourage you to contact the administrator to contest the suspension.

    Does this seem fair to you? Please make your suggestions.

    Please select an affiliation to sign your evaluation:

    Cancel Evaluation Save

    Please select an affiliation:

    Cancel   Save

    Marcin's Peer Evaluation activity

    Marcin has...

    Trusted 0
    Reviewed 0
    Emailed 0
    Shared/re-used 0
    Discussed 0
    Invited 0
    Collected 0
    Invite this peer to...
    Title
    Start date (dd/mm/aaaa)
    Location
    URL
    Message
    send
    Close

    Full Text request

    Your request will be sent.

    Please enter your email address to be notified
    when this article becomes available

    Your email


     
    Your email address will not be shared or spammed.