Reading PAGE

Peer Evaluation activity

Downloads 259

Total impact ?

    Send a

    Harold has...

    Trusted 0
    Reviewed 0
    Emailed 0
    Shared/re-used 0
    Discussed 0
    Invited 0
    Collected 0

     

    This was brought to you by:

    block this user Harold Carter

    Research Fellow

    Oxford University

    FROM SLUMS TO SLUMS IN THREE GENERATIONS; HOUSING POLICY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATE, 1945-2005

    Export to Mendeley

    Housing was the major domestic priority of all postwar UK governments. By 1970 the physical conditions of British housing had been transformed; by the 1990s seventy per cent of households in England owned their own homes. Yet in 2012 there were still parts of many cities that deserved labeling as slums. Why had massive public expenditure not managed to achieve the goal of successive governments? Vested interests, created by each wave of intervention, limited subsequent policy choices. From about 1950 to about 1995, governments expanded owner occupation via a wide range of subsidies, but increasingly restricted the supply of land by restrictive planning laws. There was a massive (and unremarked) tenurial revolution, as privately rented houses were sold off to owner occupiers. At the same time, slum clearance created large single-tenure areas. This changed the nature of the demand for council housing (once occupied by the upper skilled working-class). In some parts of the country, gentrification removed a once-affordable source of owner-occupied housing. But rent control meant there were few homes for would-be renters. Access to good quality social housing thus became a very high-stakes game, for those on modest incomes – and a major source of ethnic tension in some inner cities. From the mid 1980s on, means-tested help with rent payments and market liberalization provided new help to would-be private renters. By 2010 this had resulted in the provision of over 2.2 million new privately rented dwellings in under twenty years (almost as many as had vanished between 1960 and 1975). Small debt-funded capitalist landlords, and tenants with limited security of tenure, would have been familiar one hundred years earlier. But this time the government was paying the rent; guaranteeing the market for a new generation of slum landlords, while producing severe disincentives to labour-market participation by the poor. This new form of subsidy (coupled with continuing high land prices) helped to increase nominal rents much faster than average earnings. Housing benefit expenditure rose £11 billion in 2000 to £22 billion in 2010. As, on the surface, the British housing market moved away from social democracy and towards market liberalism, its underpinnings moved in the opposite direction. Measure was piled on measure, and subsidy on subsidy, until at the end of the century the influence of government had become all- pervasive. Social amelioration of this kind faces two major problems. The first problem is that it tends to reward the majority at the expense of the weak. The second great problem is that it depends on a continuing flow of new resources, to fix each new problem while still maintaining preserving the interests of existing clients. If liberal democracies survive by buying-off trouble from new problems, while continuing to support accrued vested interests, how will they manage if economic growth can no longer be relied upon? Based on the experience of the UK housing market, it seems likely that they will focus their resources on those in the middle. This does not bode well for the poor.

    Oh la laClose

    Your session has expired but don’t worry, your message
    has been saved.Please log in and we’ll bring you back
    to this page. You’ll just need to click “Send”.

    Your evaluation is of great value to our authors and readers. Many thanks for your time.

    Review Close

    Short review
    Select a comment
    Select a grade
    You and the author
    Anonymity My review is anonymous( Log in  or  Register )
    publish
    Close

    When you're done, click "publish"

    Only blue fields are mandatory.

    Relation to the author*
    Overall Comment*
    Anonymity* My review is anonymous( Log in  or  Register )
     

    Focus & Objectives*

    Have the objectives and the central topic been clearly introduced?

    Novelty & Originality*

    Do you consider this work to be an interesting contribution to knowledge?

    Arrangement, Transition and Logic

    Are the different sections of this work well arranged and distributed?

    Methodology & Results

    Is the author's methodology relevant to both the objectives and the results?

    Data Settings & Figures

    Were tables and figures appropriate and well conceived?

    References and bibliography

    Is this work well documented and has the bibliography been properly established?

    Writing

    Is this work well written, checked and edited?

    Write Your Review (you can paste text as well)
    Please be civil and constructive. Thank you.


    Grade (optional, N/A by default)

    N/A 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
    Close

    Your mailing list is currently empty.
    It will build up as you send messages
    and links to your peers.

     No one besides you has access to this list.
    Close
    Enter the e-mail addresses of your recipients in the box below.  Note: Peer Evaluation will NOT store these email addresses   log in
    Your recipients

    Your message:

    Your email : Your email address will not be stored or shared with others.

    Your message has been sent.

    Description

    Title : FROM SLUMS TO SLUMS IN THREE GENERATIONS; HOUSING POLICY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATE, 1945-2005
    Author(s) : Harold Carter
    Abstract : Housing was the major domestic priority of all postwar UK governments. By 1970 the physical conditions of British housing had been transformed; by the 1990s seventy per cent of households in England owned their own homes. Yet in 2012 there were still parts of many cities that deserved labeling as slums. Why had massive public expenditure not managed to achieve the goal of successive governments? Vested interests, created by each wave of intervention, limited subsequent policy choices. From about 1950 to about 1995, governments expanded owner occupation via a wide range of subsidies, but increasingly restricted the supply of land by restrictive planning laws. There was a massive (and unremarked) tenurial revolution, as privately rented houses were sold off to owner occupiers. At the same time, slum clearance created large single-tenure areas. This changed the nature of the demand for council housing (once occupied by the upper skilled working-class). In some parts of the country, gentrification removed a once-affordable source of owner-occupied housing. But rent control meant there were few homes for would-be renters. Access to good quality social housing thus became a very high-stakes game, for those on modest incomes – and a major source of ethnic tension in some inner cities. From the mid 1980s on, means-tested help with rent payments and market liberalization provided new help to would-be private renters. By 2010 this had resulted in the provision of over 2.2 million new privately rented dwellings in under twenty years (almost as many as had vanished between 1960 and 1975). Small debt-funded capitalist landlords, and tenants with limited security of tenure, would have been familiar one hundred years earlier. But this time the government was paying the rent; guaranteeing the market for a new generation of slum landlords, while producing severe disincentives to labour-market participation by the poor. This new form of subsidy (coupled with continuing high land prices) helped to increase nominal rents much faster than average earnings. Housing benefit expenditure rose £11 billion in 2000 to £22 billion in 2010. As, on the surface, the British housing market moved away from social democracy and towards market liberalism, its underpinnings moved in the opposite direction. Measure was piled on measure, and subsidy on subsidy, until at the end of the century the influence of government had become all- pervasive. Social amelioration of this kind faces two major problems. The first problem is that it tends to reward the majority at the expense of the weak. The second great problem is that it depends on a continuing flow of new resources, to fix each new problem while still maintaining preserving the interests of existing clients. If liberal democracies survive by buying-off trouble from new problems, while continuing to support accrued vested interests, how will they manage if economic growth can no longer be relied upon? Based on the experience of the UK housing market, it seems likely that they will focus their resources on those in the middle. This does not bode well for the poor.
    Keywords : Housing, Social Democracy, Slums, Equality, Avner Offer

    Subject : UK Housing Policy since 1945
    Area : History
    Language : English
    Year : 2012

    Affiliations Oxford University
    Department : Economic and Social History
    University : Oxford University
    Journal : Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History
    Issue : 98
    Publisher : Nuffield College Oxford
    City : Oxford

    Leave a comment

    This contribution has not been reviewed yet. review?

    You may receive the Trusted member label after :

    • Reviewing 10 uploads, whatever the media type.
    • Being trusted by 10 peers.
    • If you are blocked by 10 peers the "Trust label" will be suspended from your page. We encourage you to contact the administrator to contest the suspension.

    Does this seem fair to you? Please make your suggestions.

    Please select an affiliation to sign your evaluation:

    Cancel Evaluation Save

    Please select an affiliation:

    Cancel   Save

    Harold's Peer Evaluation activity

    Harold has...

    Trusted 0
    Reviewed 0
    Emailed 0
    Shared/re-used 0
    Discussed 0
    Invited 0
    Collected 0
    Invite this peer to...
    Title
    Start date (dd/mm/aaaa)
    Location
    URL
    Message
    send
    Close

    Full Text request

    Your request will be sent.

    Please enter your email address to be notified
    when this article becomes available

    Your email


     
    Your email address will not be shared or spammed.